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CHAPTER 12
Criminal Law and Procedure
HENRY P. MONAGHAN
§12.1. Introduction. The recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in the area of criminal procedure have begun to have
a considerable impact upon litigation in the Massachusetts courts; in-
deed, for at least the second successive year' the major emphasis of the
Supreme Judicial Court's criminal law opinions centered upon con-
siderations of "criminal due process." On the whole, the Court demon-
strated an admirable concern for protecting the requirements of a
fair trial. However, in at least two significant areas its decisions are
open to considerable question: (1) in a series of opinions the Court
confined the admittedly unclear decision of Escobedo v. United States
2
within very narrow bounds; and (2) the Court still continues to balk
at a liberal pretrial discovery.
A. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§12.2. Arrest, search, and seizure. During the 1965 SURVEY year,
the Supreme Judicial Court continued to struggle with the still very
troublesome questions arising from the rapidly emerging constitutional
limitations upon police investigatory methods. These restrictions arise
in significant part, though by no means wholly, from the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized. 1
While a number of questions, including, for example, that of the pre-
cise relationship between the "search and seizure" and "Warrant"
clauses, remain unsettled, judicial interpretation has placed two im-
portant matters beyond further challenge: (1) No person may be "ar-
rested," with or without a warrant, unless, at the time of arrest, the
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2 378 U.S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964).
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police had "probable cause" to believe him guilty of a crime; 2 and
(2) under Mapp v. Ohio,s evidence obtained by the police as an inci-
dent to an unconstitutional arrest is inadmissible at trial.
Three decisions in the 1965 SURVEY year illustrate the far-reaching
impact of these rules upon the police investigatory process. In Com-
monwealth v. Young4 the defendant, appealing from a conviction for
armed robbery, argued that a confession made by him while in police
custody was erroneously admitted into evidence because it was obtained
as an incident to an unconstitutional arrest: at the time of the arrest,
the police lacked "probable cause" to believe him guilty of the.crime.
Although concluding that the contention was not supported in the
record, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed that, like tangible evidence,
a confession obtained as an incident to an unconstitutional arrest must
be excluded. 5 The importance of such a rule is manifest: confessions
may be rendered inadmissible, not because they are "coerced," but
merely because they have been obtained as an incident to an arrest
without probable cause.
In Commonwealth v. Law ton,6 a police officer had received informa-
tion of a breaking and entering, and shortly thereafter came across a
man who fitted the general description of the alleged criminal. On
2 For example, Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 Sup. Ct. 168, 171, 4
L. Ed. 2d 134, 138 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310, 79 Sup. Ct.
329, 331, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 330 (1959). In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 Sup. Ct.
223, 225, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 145 (1964), the Court said: "Whether that arrest was
constitutionally valid depends . . . upon whether, at the moment the arrest was
made, the officers had probable cause to make it-whether at that moment the
facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense."
For a collection of cases on probable cause in various fact situations, see Carden,
Federal Power to Search and Seize, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1964), and Comment, 25
Ohio St. L.J. 502 (1964). See generally Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immunities
c. 3 (1961).
3 367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). See 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass.
Law §10.4; 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§10.2, 11.7, 21.6; 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law
§§10.2, 21.1. Several years prior to Mapp, the California Supreme Court marshaled
most of the arguments for the exclusionary rule in an impressive opinion by Jus-
tice Traynor. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
4 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 749, 206 N,E.2d 694, also noted in §11.5 supra.
5 "Unless the police then had probable cause, the arrest was illegal and the state-
ments that were obtained were unavailable as evidence." Id. at 750, 206 N.E.2d at
695. The Court viewed Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US. 471, 484-486, 83 Sup.
Ct. 407, 415-417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 452-454 (1963), as dispositive of the question. The
Court may have viewed this exclusionary rule too broadly. Wong Sun held exclud-
able incriminating statements made as an incident to an illegal arrest. A question
which Young does not consider is whether a sufficient passage of time from the
illegal arrest would permit statements then made to be free of the "taint" of the
original illegal arrest. See 371 U.S. at 491, 83 Sup. Ct. at 419, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 457.
See generally Peninsylvania v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1965); Lockhart, Kami-
sar, and Choper, Constitutional-Criminal Procedure 145 (1964). See also Maguire,
How to Unpoison the Fruit -the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule,
55 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 307 (1964).
6 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1277, 202 N.E.2d 824, noted in §11.5 supra.
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questioning, the defendant refused to respond to the officer's inquiry
and gave evasive answers; he was thereupon arrested "for being abroad
in the nighttime," and was not formally charged with breaking and
entering until "after he had been booked at the police station and
searched," at which time incriminating evidence was uncovered.7 In
upholding a denial of a motion to suppress, the Court said that at the
time of Lawton's arrest there was probable cause to believe him
guilty of breaking and entering and "the Commonwealth should not
be conclusively bound or limited by the officer's choice of words made
subjectively in the active execution of his duties."8 Accordingly, it
said, "if the facts known to the officer reasonably permitted a conclu-
sion that probable cause existed for a charge of breaking and entering,
the arrest should be treated as legal even though he at first assigned
another ground."9
Commonwealth v. Roy, 1° too, posed a problem of police detention of
a suspect as a crime-solving device. There had been a recent series of
housebreaks in Milton. At two o'clock on a Saturday afternoon a police
officer saw Roy, a young man, at a bus stop standing beside a suitcase,
with a paper bag under his arm. Simply because he averted the officer's
gaze, Roy was questioned. Under questioning, he told a story full of
contradiction; and, upon request, he "voluntarily" opened his suitcase,
which contained a filing case but no clothes. Roy thereupon "volun-
tarily" agreed to go to the station to straighten things out, where he
confessed. A motion to suppress the use of the suitcase and filing cabinet
was filed, the argument being that they were evidence obtained as an
incident to an arrest for which there was "no probable cause." Denial
of the motion was not error, said the Supreme Judicial Court; the evi-
dence was obtained as a result of "voluntary" action by defendant-
opening the suitcase, which, in turn, was "incidental to a reasonable
and brief on-the-street inquiry by alert police officers. No arrest had
then taken place."" And, the Court went on, this brief investigation
yielded results (a story full of contradictions, a suitcase containing a
filing case) which then gave the police "probable cause" to believe a
felony had been committed by defendant.
The underlying problem presented by the Roy case is one of far-
reaching importance: May the police impose any restraint on an
individual as an incident to crime solution, if at that time they lack
"probable cause" to believe that individual guilty of the crime; or, to
put the matter somewhat differently, is all evidence obtained by the
police as a result of any detention of a person, however slight, to be
7 Id. at 1278-1279, 202 N.E.2d at 826.
8 Ibid.
9 Id. at 1280, 202 N.E.2d at 826. The First Circuit is in agreement. Lawton v.
Dacey, 352 F.2d 61 (1965). The court's handling of the Roy case thus obviated the
necessity of passing on several questions of far-reaching importance. See notes 17-18
infra and accompanying text.
10 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 799, 207 N.E.2d 284, also noted in §11.5 supra.
11 Id. at 803, 207 N.E.2d at 287.
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excluded unless the police had probable cause to believe him guilty of
a crime? Plainly, the answer must be in the affirmative, if every deten-
tion, no matter how slight, is, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,
tantamount to an "arrest."
While there is a sharp conflict of opinion on the question,' 2 it seems
that perfectly legitimate and necessary police investigation might be
severely impeded by any view of the Fourth Amendment which equated
every detention, however slight, with an "arrest."' 3 The Fourth Amend-
ment, it will be noted, speaks in terms of "seizures," not "arrests." Of
course, an arrest is one form of seizure, a very drastic one - "the taking
of a person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer
for the commission of an offense." Such a seizure has, quite plainly, a
most drastic impact upon the individual, since it involves a total dis-
ruption of his normal activities at least until he is released on bail.
Accordingly, if the "probable cause" language of the "Warrant" clause
is to have any meaning, it must be taken to require that a "warrant"
for this type of seizure be based on the existence of "probable cause,"
and quite obviously if an arrest with warrant requires probable cause,
arrests without warrants must be held to at least the same standard.14
But, equally plainly, there are "seizures" such as a brief on-the-street
detention involved in Roy which have a far less drastic impact on the
individual. It seems entirely consistent with the broad purposes of the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable" seizures to
recognize that "probable cause" be required only of seizures having all
or most of the characteristics of an "arrest."' 15 And on-the-street deten-
12 Compare, for example, Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 16, 37-39 (1957), with Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States,
1962 Duke L.J. 319, 333, and Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of
Arrest, 54 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 393, 401-419 (1963). See generally Kamisar, Illegal
Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue
on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. Ill. L.F. 78, 115-119; Police
Interrogation Privileges and Immunities: An International Symposium, 52 J. Crim.
L., C. & P.S. 2-46 (1961); Remington, The Law Relating to "on the Street" Deten-
don, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in
General, 51 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 386 (1960); Vorenberg, Police Retention and In-
terrogation of Uncounselled Suspects: The Supreme Court and the States, 44 B.U.L.
Rev. 423, 427-428 (1964).
13 See, for example, Section 1 of the Uniform Arrest Act. The author recognizes,
of course, that those who would equate every detention with an "arrest" would re-
ject this definition, and that "arrest" is derived from origins which meant only "to
stop." Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2 Vand. L. Rev. 509, 522 (1949).
14 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 Sup. Ct. 223, 228, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 147
(1964).
15 Kuhn, Reflections on N.Y. Stop and Frisk Law and Its Claimed Unconstitu-
tionality, 56 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 32, 35 (1965); Leagre, The Fourth Amendment
and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 393, 406-407 (1963). The state courts
have generally sustained the constitutionality of a brief on-the-street detention.
See, for example, Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 196 N.E.2d 840 (1964),
noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.2, 12.2, 22.1; People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d
441. 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964). The Supreme Court has not definitely passed on the
question, although Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 Sup. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d
134 (1959), looks in the direction of equating all detentions with arrests. However,
§12.2
1965 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW
tion, which imposes a minimum interference with a person's liberty,
should be justified for any "reasonable" suspicion, and not require a
showing of "probable cause," although even by this standard Roy seems
unsound. 16
Although every investigatory detention need not for constitutional
purposes amount to an "arrest," difficult problems press for answer.
What happens if the suspect refuses to answer or otherwise co-operate?
The Uniform Arrest Act authorizes detention at the police station for
two hours, but if there is then no probable cause for an arrest the
suspect must be released. This provision seems to reach, if in fact it
does not cross, the constitutional boundary, for any detention at a
police station necessarily involves in significant part the disruption of
a person's life which we traditionally associate with an "arrest."' 17 The
Massachusetts "being abroad in the nighttime" act, it will be noted,
provides that "persons so suspected [of unlawful design] ...may be
arrested ... [and imprisoned] or otherwise incarcerated ... and taken
before a district court to be examined and prosecuted [for what? Un-
lawful design; failure to give a satisfactory account?]." To permit such
drastic detention absent "probable cause" seems a clear violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and perhaps of the Fifth also.' 8
§12.3. Right to counsel. The single question most often consid-
ered by the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1965 SURvEY year was
the reach of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo v.
Illinois.' And the Supreme Judicial Court gave it a confining, indeed
a choking, interpretation.
Escobedo must be seen in some context. The great majority of all
criminal convictions are bottomed upon confessions, 2 and the police
vigorously insist that without them most convictions simply would be
unobtainable.3 There are, however, many who greatly mistrust convic-
in the Henry case the government conceded that an arrest had been made, and in
Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 Sup. Ct. 1431, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1688 (1960), the
government's brief explicitly sought to get the Court to sustain the constitutionality
of on-the-street detention. The Court did not reach the question.
16 In Roy, it can hardly be thought that the officer -had any reasonable basis to
suspect (let alone believe) that Roy was guilty of any crime. Reasonable suspicion
was lacking for an on-the-street detention. See Leagre, id. at 411-416; Comment,
78 Harv. L. Rev. 473, 475-476 (1964). And I take it that no one would dispute
when Roy was being so questioned he was under some form of detention. See, e.g.,
Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest, 51
J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 402, 403, 407 (1960).
17 See, for example. Leagre, id. at 417-418; see generally other materials cited in
notes 12-16 supra.
18 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §112, at 120.
§12.3. 1378 U.S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964).
2 Most convictions are of course the result of guilty pleas. See Note, 112 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 865 (1964).
8 See Inbau and Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 203-209 (1962). See
the critical book reviews thereof by Professor Kamisar in 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 728
(1963), and Mr. 0. John Rogge in 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1516 (1963), both of which are
extremely critical of the police investigatory techniques advocated by Messrs. Inbau
and Reid.
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tions resting upon confessions. This mistrust stems not only from a
belief that these confessions are inherently unreliable -the result of
often hard-to-detect coercion, either physical or psychological - but
from a sense that reliance upon confessions is inconsistent with our
whole adversary (as opposed to an inquisitorial) system of justice.4
These clashing views, embodying as they do fundamental value
choices, have been in constant tension,5 but at least on the judicial
plane there has been a slow drift toward restricting the use of confes-
sions as a basis for convictions,6 a drift which, as will be seen, reached
significant proportions in Escobedo. Until Escobedo, there were but two
significant constitutional restrictions on the use of confessions in state
criminal trials: (1) confessions obtained as an incident to an unconsti-
tutional arrest must be excluded, which, as has been observed, is a rule
of very recent origin; 7 and (2) it has, of course, been long settled that
use of coerced confessions violates due process.8 Escobedo's principal
impact is in the coerced confession area. While coerced confessions are
in principle inadmissible, the question whether "coercion" has in fact
occurred necessitates a most unsatisfactory judicial inquiry,9 one which
seeks to reconstruct what happened months (perhaps years) ago in a
police station, including the precise nature of the interrogation em-
ployed and the state of the defendant's mind.10 Not surprisingly, the
4Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-386, 84 Sup. Ct. 1774, 1785-1786, 12 L. Ed.
2d 908, 920-921 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-541, 81 Sup. Ct. 735,
739-740, 5 L. Ed. 2d 760, 766-767 (1961).
5 The depths and ramifications of this conflict are brilliantly explored in Packer,
Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1964).
6 Id. at 35-36.
7 See §12.2 supra, notes 4-6.
8 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936).
9 The whole concept of the voluntary-involuntary distinction is in a state of con-
siderable confusion. Originally, coerced confessions were excluded because they
were assumed to be untrustworthy, 3 Wigmore, Evidence §822 (3d ed. 1940), and
accordingly, on this basis a great many courts admitted the confession even if co-
erced where it was "corroborated by other evidence." But see Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 376-377, 84 Sup. Ct. 1774, 1780-1781, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 915-916 (1963);
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 Sup. Ct. 735, 5 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1961). It is
quite clear that such a monistic approach to the exclusion of coerced confessions is
not possible; "a complex of values underlies the structure against use by the state
of confession which, by way of convenient shorthand, this Court terms involuntary."
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207, 80 Sup. Ct. 274, 280, 4 L. Ed. 2d 242, 248-
249 (1960). See Jackson v. Denno and Rogers v. Richmond supra. Accordingly,
there has been an increasing tendency to focus on the method of interrogation used
rather than on the defendant's state of mind. See Hayes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503, 83 Sup. Ct. 1336, 10 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1963); Inbau and Sowle, Cases and Com-
ment on Criminal Justice 845-849 (2d ed. 1960); Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Third Degree, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 411, 429-430 (1954).
10 The Court is acutely aware of the problem. See, e.g., Hayes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503, 515, 83 Sup. Ct. 1336, 1344, 10 L. Ed. 2d 513, 521-522 (1963). Since
there has been an increasing concern with the method of interrogation used rather
than the state of defendant's mind, it should be noted that there is an increasing
tendency to objectify the testimony of "voluntariness" so as to exclude confessions
which are the result of "inherently coercive" interrogation. See materials cited in
previous note.
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job of reconstruction takes place against sharp conflicts of testimony,
which, for various reasons, tend to be resolved against the accused. This
fact, coupled with the necessarily limited scope of appellate review,
often results in the constitutional right existing in form but not in fact.
Several suggestions have been made to cope with this problem. Some
would exclude all confessions not made in open court; others would bar
use of confessions obtained while the defendant is in "police custody,"
on the belief that, generally at least, such a situation is "inherently"
coercive." No court has expressly adopted either approach, although
the latter situation has partially obtained in the federal courts through
the McNabb-Mallory12 rule excluding confessions obtained after un-
necessary delay in bringing an accused before a commissioner. How-
ever, since the McNabb-Mallory rule is said to rest upon the high
Court's supervisory power over the administration of justice in the
federal courts, it is not, in terms, applicable to the states, and the great
majority of the state courts, including our own, have refused volun-
tarily to adopt it.
1
3
Accordingly, until Escobedo, the state courts structured their inquiry
in terms of the elusive "coercion," and the fact that a confession was
obtained while in the "coercive" context of police station interrogation
was not of itself enough to require its exclusion. Seen in this light,
Escobedo is of considerable importance, because, at the very minimum,
it places severe limitations on the use of confessions obtained while the
defendant is in police custody. In. Escobedo, the defendant had been
rearrested on a charge of murder. At the police station he was inten-
sively interrogated by a battery of police officers, without any opportu-
nity to consult with his attorney, despite the fact that both he and his
lawyer pressed for such an opportunity. Moreover, at no time was he
warned of his constitutional right to remain silent. After five hours of
interrogation, and with the assistance of some subterfuge, the police ex-
tracted a confession. The defendant's motion to suppress use of the
confession was denied, and he was convicted. On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court set aside the conviction, holding that, on these
facts, the defendant had been denied the Sixth Amendment's guarantee
that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
.. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."' 14
The rationale of the holding is, however, the subject of considerable
11 See, e.g., Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57,
69 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1351, 93 L. Ed. 1801, 1808 (1949), and dissenting in Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 203-204, 72 Sup. Ct. 599, 610, 96 L. Ed. 872, 887-888 (1952).
12 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943);
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 Sup. Ct. 1356, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479 (1957).
For a good statement of the purpose of the operation of this rule, see United States
v. Middleton, 344 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1965).
1 But cf. Commonwealth v. Bouchard, 347 Mass. 418, 198 N.E.2d 411 (1964),
noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.3. The McNabb-Mallory rule, properly
understood, is of constitutional dimension. Note, 68 Yale L.J. 1003 (1959).
14 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 1765, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977,
986 (1964).
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controversy. The Court plainly took a jaundiced view of convictions
based upon police station confessions. History "ancient and modern"
was cited to show "the unreliability of any system of criminal law en-
forcement which comes to depend on the use of the confession," and
the morally debasing qualities of any such system were stressed.15
Against this background, the Court said:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into cus-
tody, the police carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself
to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and
been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the
police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitu-
tional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the
Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment ...
[Emphasis supplied.]16
In the last paragraph of the opinion, the holding was stated in lan-
guage presumably meant to be consistent with the foregoing quote, but
capable of a more open-ended application:
We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to
accusatory - when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to
elicit a confession -our adversary system begins to operate, and,
under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to
consult with his lawyer. [Emphasis supplied.]' 7
In the 1965 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court was faced with
a battery of alleged Escobedo violations;' 8 and in all but one case' 9 the
claims were rejected. The Court, somewhat haltingly, developed a gen-
erally consistent, if narrow, interpretation of Escobedo, by stressing
again and again the often overlooked language that the confessions are
15 Id. at 488-489, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1764, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 985. The Court quoted
with approval Dean Wigmore, who noted that: "The inclination develops to rely
mainly upon such evidence and to be satisfied with incomplete investigation of
the other sources. The exercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetful-
ness of the just limitations of that power. The simple and peaceful process of
questioning breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and tor-
ture." Id. at 489, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1764, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 985.
16 Id. at 490-491, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1765, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 986.
'7 Id. at 492, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1766, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 987.
18 Commonwealth v. Tracy, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 653, 664, 207 N.E.2d 16, 23;
Commonwealth v. Lepore, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 691, 693-694, 207 N.E.2d 26, 28;
Commonwealth v. Young, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 749, 753, 206 N.E.2d 694, 696; Com-
monwealth v. Roy, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 799, 805, 207 N.E.2d 284, 287; Common-
wealth v. Guerro, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 869, 871-873, 207 N.E.2d 887, 890-891; Com-
monwealth v. Kerrigan, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 889, 891-892, 207 N.E.2d 882, 889-890.
See discussion of the cases in §§11.4, 11.5 supra.
19Commonwealth v. Guerro, supra note 18. The defendant must, of course,
shoulder the burden of preparing an adequate record on which to raise the ques-
tion. Commonwealth v. Fancy, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 771, 780, 207 N.E.2d 276, 283.
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not excludable under Escobedo unless obtained by "a process of inter-
rogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements."
2 0
Little is to be gained by a detailed examination of the individual
decisions, particularly since the welter of cases throughout the country
involving alleged violations of Escobedo means that clarification by the
Supreme Court will not be long in forthcoming. Some general com-
ments are, however, in order. The Supreme Judicial Court's opinion
contains an important insight in the Court's hardheaded refusal to
be blinded by a facile "investigatory-accusatory" distinction. The Court
has implicitly recognized that while Escobedo spoke the language of
a denial of the Sixth Amendment's "assistance of counsel," it was pri-
marily concerned with protecting the constitutional guarantees against
self-incrimination and coerced confessions. 2' Accordingly, the Court
ruled out automatic application of Escobedo when the interrogation
took place in a situation which to it did not look "inherently" coer-
cive. 22 It refused to apply Escobedo when the confessions were made
not in a police station but in an apartment, Commonwealth v. Lepore;
in a hospital, Commonwealth v. Tracy; on the street, Commonwealth
v. Roy; or where the defendant was in custody but "gushed forth" his
confession, Commonwealth v. Ladetto; but found it applicable to a
police interrogation in a police station, Commonwealth v. Guerro.2 3
In none of the cases was the accused warned of his rights to remain
silent and to counsel.
Some of these decisions do not seem sound even in terms of the
Court's own narrow criteria.24 Moreover, and more importantly here,
20 378 U.S. 478, 491, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 1765, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 986 (1964).
21 As Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936),
recognized, the privilege against self-incrimination and the rule against coerced
confession stem from different sources. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§2263-2264 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961). Accordingly, though it was not until Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964), that the Fifth Amendment's privi-
lege against self-incrimination was held to be a restriction of the states, the use of
coerced confession was held to be a violation of due process as early as the Brown
case. The Malloy case, noting the affinity between the two rules, relied heavily on
the coerced confession cases for imposing the privilege against self-incrimination as
a restriction on the states. 378 U.S. at 6-7, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1492-1493, 12 L. Ed. 2d
at 658-659.
22 But see Whittemore, dissenting in Commonwealth v. Tracy, 1965 Mass. Adv.
Sh. 653, 666-667, 207 N.E.2d 16, 24, and Russo v. New Jersey, 33 U.S.L. Week 2621
(3d Cir. 1965). I recognize, of course, that I may be imposing on these cases a unity
which they do not possess.
23 See note 18 supra. But compare Commonwealth v. Young and Commonwealth
v. Kerrigan, note 18 supra.
24 Kerrigan seems to me plainly wrong. See Kerrigan v. Scafati, 348 F.2d 187 (1st
Cir. 1965), ordering an evidentiary hearing on Kerrigan's claims. Justice Whitte-
more's dissent in Commonwealth v. Tracy, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 653, 664, 207 N.E.2d
16, 23, seems to me persuasive, and to find support in Russo v. New Jersey, note 22
supra. Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 823, 207 N.E.2d 536, is cor-
rect in refusing to apply Escobedo to confessions "gushed forth" where there is no
chance of giving a warning, but Ladetto made several "confirmatory" confessions
which were clearly excludable under Escobedo. Yet, these discussions were admitted
as merely "confirmatory," 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 829, 207 N.E.2d at 541, without any
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the Court's view of Escobedo is too narrow. The Supreme Judicial
Court apparently believes that a warning of the rights to silence and
counsel is required only in a police station or in similar "coercive" cir-
cumstances, where the purpose of the interrogation is to elicit a con-
fession. Escobedo, however, embodies two distinct concerns which the
Supreme Judicial Court has run together. First, Escobedo may be an-
other substantial step leading to a complete ban on the "police station"
confession, no matter what warning is given -absent, perhaps, a con-
vincing showing by the police that the confession was completely
"voluntary." 25
Second, Escobedo seems also to embody a philosophy that constitu-
tional rights not be lost through unawareness. Most people apparently
assume that they must "answer" and "co-operate" with the police.
Escobedo seems-in principle applicable against this kind of "coercion,"
and as a constitutional minimum to require that when the police have
made an individual any kind of a suspect, they may not interrogate
him anywhere without advising him of his rights to counsel and to
silence. The anguished wail of the police that such a rule would have
a destructive impact on police investigation is unpersuasive: it is specu-
lative - the Federal Bureau of Investigation has long operated on these
principles without adverse consequences; moreover, as the Court ob-
served in Escobedo, "We have also learned the... lesson of history that
no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to de-
pend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through
unawareness of their constitutional rights."
26
One last aspect of the right-to-counsel cases remains to be noted. In
the "current swift pace of constitutional change," 27 the question of the
retroactive effect of the constitutional doctrine demanded answer; that
is, what is the status of convictions obtained when "criminal due pro-
cess" was given a more niggardly construction? In its benchmark deci-
sion in Linkletter v. Walker,2s the United States Supreme Court, in
discussions of cases such as Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 74 Sup. Ct. 716, 98 L. Ed.
948 (1954).
25 The McNabb-Malory rule, supra note 12, points strongly in this direction, and
" Escobedo could be viewed as imposing that rule on the states. Enke and Elsen,
Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Minn.
L. Rev. 47, 85-91 (1964). See also, the "objective" coerced confession cases, note 9
supra. Russo v. New Jersey, note 22 supra, considers the interplay of these differ-
ent doctrines. Though it does not in form at least agree with the analysis here
suggested, I submit that it is apparent from the case itself that all these doctrines
are moving toward the same end. For a brilliant and persuasive argument that
Escobedo tolls the death knell for all confessions obtained in the "inherently
coercive" atmosphere of a police station, see Sutherland, Crime and Confession,
79 Harv. L. Rev. 21 (1965).
26 378 U.S. 478, 490, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 1764, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 985 (1964); see
Russo v. New Jersey, note 22 supra, at 2621. The similarity between this result and
the "Judges' Rules" is apparent. See Inbau and Sowle, Cases and Comments on
Criminal Justice 865-869 (2d ed. 1960).
27 Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 4, 84 Sup. Ct. 80, 81, 11 L. Ed. 2d 41,
42 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan).
28381 U.S. 618, 85 Sup. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965).
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holding that the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio need not be ap-
plied retroactively, recognized that, generally, the newly emerging rules.
foster two quite dissimilar policies: some, such as the exclusionary rule
of Mapp, are primarily designed to deter illegal police conduct; others,
however, are intimately concerned with "the fairness of the trial - the
very integrity of the fact-finding process." 29 Manifestly, nothing is
added to the efficacy of rules designed to deter police misconduct by
applying.them to convictions long closed; however, convictions which,
when they were obtained, "lacked reliability" cry out for re-examina-
tion. On this basis, the Court ruled in Subilosky v. Commonwealth30
that the indigent's right to counsel must be applied retroactively since,
as Gideon v. Wainwright makes clear, a conviction obtained without
counsel "lacks reliability."3'
§12.4. Pretrial publicity: Right to speedy trial. The troublesome
problems posed by publicity before and during trial have yet to receive
a definitive ruling from the United States Supreme Court, if indeed
any definitive ruling is possible.' In an advisory opinion, 2 the Justices
indicated their belief that the Commonwealth could go quite far in
suppressing publicity threatening a defendant's right to a fair trial, but
in two litigated cases the Court seems to have taken a step backward
from its groundbreaking decision in Commonwealth v. Crehan.3
In Commonwealth v. Kiernan4 and Commonwealth v. Monahan,5
two cases arising out of the well-publicized Boston Common under-
ground parking garage scandal, the defendants were under indictments
for larceny and conspiracy. In each case the trial judge refused to pro-
pound questions "to determine whether the prospective petit jurors
were impartial." The Supreme Judicial Court treated the issue as one
for the discretion of the trial judge and, somewhat perfunctorily, found
no abuse.6 But one wonders why in any well-publicized case the trial
judge ought not to be compelled to take some affirmative steps to insure
that massive pretrial publicity does not in fact erode a defendant's
right to an impartial jury.
In Monahan, the Court was also faced with a question expressly left
29 Id. at 639, 85 Sup. Ct. at 1743, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 614.
30 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1121, 209 N.E.2d 316, also noted in §11.11 supra.
31 Id. at 1125, 209 N.E.2d at 319.
§12.4. 1 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965). Since certiorari has
been sought, Docket No. 490, 34 U.S.L. Week 3077 (Aug. 31, 1965), this case may
afford an opportunity for such a definitive ruling. For a collection of materials on
the subject, see Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed - A Study of Prejudicial News
Reporting in Criminal Cases, 56 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 1, 158 (1965).
2 Opinion of the Justices,.1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 973, 208 N.E.2d 240. The questions
raised in this advisory opinion are outside the scope of this paper.
3 345 Mass. 609, 188 N.E.2d 923 (1963), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law
§§11.4, 21.7.
4 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1155, 201 N.E.2d 504.
5 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 713, 207 N.E.2d 29.
6 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1159, 201 N.E.2d at 508; 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 727, 207
N.E.2d at 40.
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open by the United States Supreme Court in Beck v. Washington,7
namely, whether bias in the grand jury denies a defendant due process.
Relying heavily upon its own previous decisions, the Court held that a
biased grand jury did not render void the subsequent conviction, be-
cause it has always been considered "that in finding indictments grand
jurors may act upon their own knowledge, or upon the knowledge of
one or more of their number. ' 8 Moreover, the Court was concerned
that "if such an inquiry were open, the delays and complexity of crimi-
nal trials would be greatly increased, and no correspondingly useful
purpose would be served."9 The holding is open to considerable ques-
tion. In an era in which there has been so much enlargement of the
guarantees afforded to a criminal defendant, the history cited by the
Court is unimpressive. 10 The argument based on the "inconvenience"
of such a requirement is equally unpersuasive. The requirement of im-
partiality usually results in some "inconvenience" for the prosecutor,
but that is the price we pay for due process. There is considerable basis
in reason and precedent for Mr. Justice Douglas' view that, while a
state need not use a grand jury, if it does so, it must provide an impar-
tial one. 1
The Sixth Amendment's "right to a speedy .. . trial"' 2 occupied
7369 U.S. 541, 546, 82 Sup. Ct. 955, 958, 8 L. Ed. 2d 98, 105 (1962); see Note, 111
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1000, 1002-1004 (1963).
8 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 713, 726, 207 N.E.2d 29, 39.
9 Ibid.
10 But see Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362, 76 Sup. Ct. 406, 408, 100
L. Ed. 397, 402 (1959). "There is every reason to believe that our constitutional
grand jury was intended to operate substantially like its English progenitor."
11 Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 579, 82 Sup. Ct. 955, 975, 8 L. Ed. 2d 98, 124
(1962) (dissenting opinion). The supporting arguments advanced by Mr. Justice
Douglas are, however, not free of difficulty. He cites the fact that criminal proceed-
ings are void if Negroes are excluded from the grand as well as the petit jury as
demonstrating that the grand jury, like the petit jury, is subject to constitutional
restraint. But that is not a complete answer, since the criminal defendant is
permitted to challenge the conviction not because it was unfairly obtained, but as
a means of implementing the constitutional policy against racial discrimination. It
does not prove that the impartial petit jury requirement -necessary to insure the
reliability of the guilt determining process-also extends to the composition of
grand juries. See Comment, The Defendant's Challenge to a Criterion in Jury
Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal Protection, 74 Yale L.J.
919 (1965). Moreover, exclusion of classes from a petit jury on a nonracial basis
has survived constitutional challenge. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 82 Sup. Ct. 159,
7 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1961) ("women"); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 67 Sup. Ct. 1613,
91 L. Ed. 2043 (1947) ("blue ribbon" juries). See, generally, Scott, The Supreme
Court's Control over State and Federal Criminal Juries, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 577 (1949).
It should be noted that a result of adopting the views of Mr. Justice Douglas might
spell the end of the grand jury as an institution, an event perhaps not to be re-
gretted. Abolition of the grand jury was one of the favorite objects of law reformers
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Younger, The Grand Jury Under
Attack, 46 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 26, 214 (1955), and the reform still has its advocates
today. Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Super Government, 51 A.B.A.J.
153 (1965). England abolished the grand jury in 1933. Devlin, The Criminal Prosecu-
tion in England 10 (1958).
12 U.S. Const., Amend. VI, which applies "as such" to the states by virtue of the
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the Court's attention in two cases. In Commonwealth v. McGrath,3
the defendant was under sentence in a federal penitentiary in Georgia
and, following the return of three indictments by a Suffolk County
grand jury, detainer warrants were placed against him. The defendant
thereupon moved for trial on the indictments, and the United States
represented that it would surrender him for trial, if it were "reim-
bursed for the associated costs." The district attorney, however, re-
fused either to pay the costs or to dismiss the indictments but, said the
Supreme Judicial Court, he must do one or the other. The Court
pointed out that, like the Sixth Amendment, Article 11 of the Common-
wealth's Declaration of Rights gives a defendant a right to a speedy
trial; and, it said, this "contemplates that the Commonwealth take
reasonable action to prevent undue delay in bringing a defendant to
trial, even though some expense may be involved."'14 However, in
Commonwealth v. Chase,15 the Court made clear that the Common-
wealth's obligation is discharged if it permits a defendant access to the
courtroom; ordinarily, at least, it need not drag him to trial.16
Viewing the right to a speedy trial in terms of the Commonwealth's
duties, rather than of the defendant's rights, results in glossing over a
potentially difficult problem. Suppose that a defendant cannot be
brought to trial through no fault of his or the Commonwealth's (e.g.,
because of sickness, or massive pretrial publicity). After a long period
of time, he becomes available for trial. Can the defendant now be
prosecuted consistent with his guarantee of a speedy trial? If that guar-
antee be analyzed in terms of the safeguards afforded to an accused,
such as protecting him from the banes of dimmed memories, loss of
evidence, harassment, etc., then the guarantee has been violated, what-
ever the cause for the delay, and the Commonwealth's good faith is ir-
relevant. When neither party is at fault, it might be thought appro-
priate to require the defendant to show actual prejudice from the
delay; but such a solution could drastically undercut the substance of
the right: the advantages secured by a right to a speedy trial are not
always capable of precise quantification in any given case. It may in
fact be true but virtually impossible to demonstrate that "things might
have been different."17
§12.5. Right to confrontation. The Sixth Amendment guarantees
to a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
85 Sup. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965). See also Mass. Const., Declaration of
Rights, Art. 11, and G.L., c. 277, §72A.
13 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 535, 205 N.E.2d 710.
14 Id. at 539, 205 N.E.2d at 714.
15 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1237, 202 N.E.2d 300.
16 "At no time has [defendant] made an unequivocal demand for trial on the
merits of the sort contemplated by G.L., c. 277, §72." Id. at 1242, 202 N.E.2d at 304.
See extensive annotation in 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 326-336 (1958).
17 See United States v. Rivera, 346 F.2d 942, 943 (2d Cir. 1965). See also, generally,
King v. United States. 265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Comment, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev.
414 (1960); Annotation, 57 A.L.R.2d 980 (1958).
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against him,"1 and Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution contains a similar provision. On April 5, 1965,
the United States Supreme Court, not surprisingly, held that the Sixth
Amendment's right of confrontation was applicable "as such" to the
states.2 One can with some confidence look for considerable litigation
before the general contours of the right to confrontation are hammered
out, but one may question the extent to which the explicit recognition
of the right adds anything of substance to the traditional notions of
procedural fairness embodied in due process. It is impossible, for ex-
ample, to view lack of a confrontation as not violating due process (for
example, in the loyalty-security program where the public interest is
great and the sanction imposed is a limited one, dismissal from employ-
ment)3 while the same lack of confrontation would be insufficient to
support the imposition of criminal punishment. Such results are plainly
possible entirely within the traditional due process framework, without
the assistance of a right of confrontation "in all criminal prosecu-
tions."4
One pressing problem which will require careful consideration is the
already visible attempt to raise the hearsay rule - a widely criticized
rule run through with countless exceptions and fictions - to the con-
stitutional plane by characterizing it as the essence of the right of con-
frontation. Two such attempts were made in the 1965 SURVEy year;
both were rightly rejected. The Sixth Amendment's guarantee is des-
ignated to prevent trial by affidavit,5 not to enshrine the hearsay rule
in the Constitution.
In Commonwealth v. Kerrigang the argument was pressed that tes-
timony of statements made to the witness by a third party were in-
admissible because it would deny the defendant his right of confron-
tation (with respect to that third party). The argument was rightly
§12.5. 1 U.S. Const., Amend. VI.
2 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 Sup. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965); Doug-
las v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 Sup. Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934, 937
(1965).
8 Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 82 Sup. Ct.
137, 7 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1961). But see McKay, The Right of Confrontation, 1959 Wash.
U.L.Q. 122, 145: "[T]here has been permitted no relaxation of procedural standards
in these most critical cases where advocacy of overthrow of the Government of the
United States is charged. Is it not curious, then, that in the cases where no such
serious charge is made, the normal elements of procedural due process should be
denied?" Compare also the confrontation problems in administrative investigations.
See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 80 Sup. Ct. 1502, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1307 (1960). Com-
pare Newman, Due Process, Investigations and Civil Rights, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 735,
763-767 (1961). The plea for a right of confrontation in the sentencing process has
met with no success. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 Sup. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed.
1337 (1948).
4 See materials cited in note 3 suprq and see Newman, The Process of Prescrib-
ing "Due Process," 49 Calif. L. Rev. 215 (1961).
5 Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 400, 418-419, 85 Sup. Ct. 1074, 1076-1077, 13 . Ed.
2d 934, 937-938 (1965); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.. 237, 242-243, 15 Sup. CL
337, 339, 39 L Ed. 409, 411 (1895).
6 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 889, 207 N.E.2d 882, also noted in §§II.4, 12.3 supra.
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rejected. The Court recognized that the right of confrontation "in-
cludes the right to cross-examine the witness whose testimony is ad-
mitted against the defendant," 7 but held that this right was preserved
since the witness against him was subject to cross-examination. Any
other result would, in essence, have elevated the entire hearsay rule to
the constitutional level, call into sharp question its numerous excep-
tions, and raise obvious questions with respect to the frequently ex-
ercised legislative power over the rule.8
In Commonwealth v. McGruder,9 the Court faced a substantially
identical problem in a "civil" context. The Court there interpreted
General Laws, Chapter 123A, the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, to
permit psychiatrists to base their opinions of the defendant on partial
hearsay, a result which seems completely sound, given the generally
unsound character of the hearsay rule. Unfortunately, however, the
opinion concluded with the following language: "It is to be noted that
proceedings under c. 123A are civil and not penal. Hence, the right of
confrontation secured to a defendant in criminal cases under Art. 12 of
our Declaration of Rights is not involved."' 0 The invocation of the
"civil-criminal" distinction is regrettable. To begin with, one might
point out the blurred character of the alleged distinction between
"civil" and "criminal" proceedings, and one might say that any pro-
ceeding which results in a substantial loss of liberty has enough of the
"penal" in it to be considered a "criminal" proceeding for the consti-
tutional purposes; 1 or, as I incline, one might despair of any attempt
to draw meaningful distinctions between "criminal" and "civil" pro-
ceedings, noting that while the Federal Constitution conditions many
of its guarantees on the existence of criminal proceedings, the Supreme
Court has never successfully come to grips with the meaning of
"crime.'12 Moreover, and more importantly, even if technically these
commitment proceedings are not "criminal" for the purposes of Article
12 of the Declaration of Rights or the Sixth Amendment, it is quite
plain that the right of confrontation is required as a matter of due
7 Id. at 893, 207 N.E.2d at 885.
8 That there is a relationship between the hearsay rule and the right of con-
frontation is of course apparent. See Comment, Preserving the Right to Confronta-
tion -A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 741 (1965).
9 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 495, 205 N.E.2d 726.
10 Id. at 498, 205 N.E.2d at 728.
11 See Allen, The Borderland of Criminal Justice 4-24 (1964). Short periods of in-
carceration would at present seem not penal, on analogy to the petty offenses cases.
United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 740, 84 Sup. Ct. 984, 1012, 12 L. Ed. 2d 23,
58 (1964) (concurring opinion); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 57
Sup. Ct. 660, 81 L. Ed. 843 (1937).
12 See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 431
(1958); Comment, The Concept of Punitive Legislation and the Sixth Amendment,
32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 290 (1965). For recent examples of attempts to distinguish "civil"
and "penal" statutes, see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 Sup. Ct. 1701, 14
L. Ed. 2d 484 (1965), and One 1948 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693,
85 Sup. Ct. 323, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965).
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process. 13 We would not and we should not tolerate a situation in
which a man can be deprived of his liberty without giving him the
right to rebut the testimony resulting in his commitment. In Mc-
Gruder, the crucial point was, as the opinion earlier recognized, that
the defendant in fact had the substance of the right of confrontation:
"If the opinions of the examining psychiatrists are based on incorrect
information, it would be open to a defendant, as was done here to some
extent, to refute it.'14 Plainly, the essence of the right of confrontation
was preserved here: the petitioner was permitted to cross-examine the
psychiatrist; and had ample opportunity to rebut the testimony against
him, including giving his explanation of the hearsay events on which
the psychiatrist relied.' 5
§12.6. Pretrial discovery. The traditional view has been that, ex-
cept in rare situations, the question of discovery in criminal cases does
not reach constitutional proportion,' and statutes and court rules gov-
erning discovery are for the most part both ungenerous in scope and
fragmentary in character.2 Accordingly, the amount of discovery to
which a defendant is entitled largely depends upon the view of the ap-
pellate courts which, although they speak in terms of the trial court's
discretion, tend to define that discretion with considerable precision.3
In the 1965 SuRvEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court repulsed several
opportunities to widen the scope of discovery in criminal cases.
Relying in part on a divided opinion of the United States Supreme
Court,4 the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Kiernan,5
Commonwealth v. Ladetto,6 and Commonwealth v. Balliro7 rebuffed at-
tempts by the defendants to inspect grand jury minutes. The Court
13See materials cited in notes 11-12 supra; Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825,
826 (D.C. Cir. 1957); see also Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1965);
1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.3.
14 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 495, 498, 205 N.E.2d 726, 728.
15 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407, 85 Sup. Ct. 1065, 1070, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923,
928 (1965).
§12.6. 1 Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 228, 229-230 (1964). As will be seen below, this view is slowly but inevitably
yielding ground. See, for example, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 Sup. Ct. 1194,
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) (willful suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to
defendant violates due process). Thomas v. United States, 343 F.2d 49, 53 (9th Cir.
1965), seems to assume that negligent suppression is also a denial of due process.
Compare, however, United States v. Palermo, 360 U.S. 343, 362-363, 79 Sup. Ct.
1217, 1229-1230, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1287, 1300-1301 (1959) (concurring opinion).
2 Traynor, note 1 supra, contains a lucid and complete discussion of the present
state of the law. If the article is to be faulted at all it is perhaps because it insuf-
ficiently realizes the movement toward placing discovery on a constitutional base.
S Despite the often restrictive attitude of the appellate courts, the cause of liberal
discovery has received much assistance from trial courts. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery
in State Criminal Cases, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 293, 298 (1960).
4 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 79 Sup. Ct. 1237, 3
L. Ed. 2d 1323 (1959).
5 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1155, 1158, 201 N.E.2d 504, 507.
6 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 823, 207 N.E.2d 536, also noted in §11.4 supra.
7 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1145, 1157-1158, 209 N.E.2d 308, 316.
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mechanically invoked as a justification the now familiar language that
"we require that the defense show that 'a particular need' exists for
the minutes which outweigh the policy of secrecy." But the Court
never considered the obvious question of how a "particularized need"
is to be demonstrated without first knowing what testimony the min-
utes contain. How, for example, is a defendant to know whether a wit-
ness's testimony contradicts prior testimony he gave to the grand jury
unless the defendant sees the transcript? Moreover, the present rule
denies a defendant a potential source of "leads" which might be help-
ful in preparing his case. In short, to require a showing of "particular-
ized need" virtually requires the defendant to know in advance what he
hopes to discover.9 Even more disturbing than the grand jury cases is
the rationale of Commonwealth v. Roy, 1 which manifested a basic
hostility to pretrial discovery. The defendant had apparently been
successful in turning a hearing on a motion to suppress "into a far-
ranging and free-wheeling expedition in which the defendant was able
to search out all the evidence, physical and testimonial, which the Com-
monwealth had.""XThis procedure, said Justice Kirk, "is not consistent
with good trial practice. It is prejudicial to the Commonwealth's right
to a fair trial."' 2 But, surely, the last statement is wholly wrongl We are
now very far removed from any philosophy that truth is best ascer-
tained by having the parties arrive for trial in total ignorance of each
other's case;' 3 and it is at the very least anomalous that pretrial discov-
ery should be favored in civil cases yet denied in criminal cases, despite
the sweep of the procedural guarantees afforded a criminal defendant.
Moreover, given its superior resources, it seems beyond doubt that the
"balance of advantage" rests with the state in criminal cases; 14 and in
such a context there is indeed very grave question whether the lack of
pretrial discovery is consistent with a defendant's right to a fair trial
and to the effective assistance of counsel.'
5
It should be noted, however, that in one significant respect the Court
did advance the cause of criminal discovery. In Commonwealth v.
8 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 823, 829, 207 N.E.2d 536, 541.
9 See, generally, Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy,
48 Va. L. Rev. 668 (1962); Seltzer, Pre-Trial Discovery of Grand Jury Testimony in
Criminal Cases, 66 Dick. L. Rev. 379 (1962); Traynor, note 1 supra, at 230.
10 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 799, 207 N.E.2d 284.
11 Id. at 800, 207 N.E.2d at 285-286. This discussion arguably belongs in the section
dealing with substantive criminal law, but is treated here for purposes of con-
venience.
12 Ibid.
13 See generally Traynor, note I supra.
14 See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149 (1960), a careful and persuasive essay demonstrating
that, contrary to some prevalent myths, the present system of criminal procedure
decidedly favors the prosecution.
15 Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-
Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 289, 334-340 (1964). We may
not be too far from the day when the defendant's right to a fair trial and to the
effective assistance of counsel will be held to embrace other forms of state assistance
such as making expert testimony available to the defendant.
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Balliro,18 the Commonwealth had denied the defense counsel access to
three material Witnesses who were kept in seclusion. This was held
error. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected any idea that witnesses
were somehow partisans of the Commonwealth, and it said:
Our Constitution secures to a defendant the right to present his
defense. Under Art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights, a defendant
"shall have a right to produce all proofs that may be favorable to,
him." If the Commonwealth could prevent access to material wit-
nesses by holding them in its custody, this constitutional guaranty
would be seriously impaired. To say that a defendant has a right
to present his defense and then to deprive him of the means of
effectively exercising that right would reduce the guaranty to an
idle gesture.
17
The result and the rationale are entirely sound. But one wonders why
this reasoning is not applicable to most pleas for discovery in criminal
cases; why should the Commonwealth be allowed to secrete information
in its custody any more than it can secrete witnesses?' 8
§12.7. Miscellaneous decisions. There were several decisions of an
evidentiary and a procedural character which should be noted although
they do not require extensive comment here. When Malloy v. Hogan'
imposed the privilege of self-incrimination on the states by virtue of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it quite plainly
carried along with it the federal standard when the privilege may be
invoked.2 Under that standard, the privilege is rightly invoked unless it
is "perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances
in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer(s) cannot
possibly have such tendency to incriminate."3 In Comtronwealth v.
Baker4 the Supreme Judicial Court expressly recognized that the fed-
eral standard must be applied, and that its prior decision defining the
context in which the privilege could be claimed in Sandrelli v. Com-
monwealth5 must give way.
Several cases repeated the well-settled rule that admissions of one
coconspirator are admissible against the other coconspirators, whether
16 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1145, 1155-1157, 209 N.E.2d 308, 314-316.
17 Id. at 1156, 209 N.E.2d at 315.
18 Moreover, in response to an argument that a denial of access is harmless error
absent a showing of actual prejudice, the Court properly recognized that "what the
posture of the defense . . . would have been if the interviews had been granted
is within the realm of conjecture," id. at 1157, 209 N.E.2d 315, an observation ob-
viously applicable to the general run of discovery pleas.
§12.7. '378 U.S. 1, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964). See Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 84 Sup. Ct. 1594, 12 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1964).
2 378 U.S. at 10-11, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1494-1495, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 660-661; see also
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 Sup. Ct. 1229, 1232-1233, 14 L. Ed. 2d
i06, 110 (1965).
3 378 U.S. at 12, 84 Sup. Ct. at i496, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 662.
4 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1187, 201 N.E.2d 829.
53M2 Mass. 129, 135, 172 NE.2d 449, 452-453 (1961).
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or not they are present when the admissions are made. Commonwealth
v. Kiernan6 contains a good discussion of the rule although, as was ob-
served in Commonwealth v. Stasiun,7 "before the acts and declarations
of one are admissible against the others, the judge must make a prelimi-
nary finding upon evidence aliunde that a conspiracy exists." S In Sta-
siun, however, the Court, in a persuasive opinion, rejected a rule
adopted by a divided United States Supreme Court9 that, given the
existence of a conspiracy, the conspirators could be convicted of the
substantive offense (as well as of the conspiracy) simply by proving that
one of the coconspirators committed the substantive offense. "To be
liable for the substantive offense" said Justice Spalding, "a co-conspira-
tor must participate or aid in the commission of it .... If the rule were
otherwise, the fundamental distinction between a substantive offence
and a conspiracy to commit that offence would be ignored." 10 The
ultimate justification invoked by the Court rested upon fundamental
considerations concerning the nature of criminal responsibility:
While it has been said that a conspiracy is a "partnership in crime"
. . . that metaphor should not be pressed too far. . . . It does not
follow that such a partnership is governed by the same principles
of vicarious liability as would apply in civil cases. Our criminal
law is founded on the principle that guilt, for the more serious
offences, is personal, not vicarious. One is punished for his own
blameworthy conduct, not that of others. 1
Various attempts to assign as error the refusal of the trial court to
sever indictments for trial purposes were, as usual, unsuccessful. In
order to prevail, a defendant apparently shoulders the heavy burden of
demonstrating actual prejudice. 12 The failure of a police officer to
comply with Chapter 90C's requirements on the issuance of an auto-
mobile law violation citation'3 was argued as depriving the District
Court of "jurisdiction" over the alleged offense, but the Supreme Judi-
cial Court did not reach the question on the record before it in Com-
monwealth v. Johnson.'4 One could, however, readily detect the Court's
hostility to the argument. Commonwealth v. Corcoran15 contains an
interesting discussion on the relationship between specifications and
6 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1155, 1179, 201 N.E.2d 504, 519.
7 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 605, 206 N.E.2d 672.
8 Id. at 616, 206 N.E.2d at 680.
9 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 Sup. Ct. 1180, 90 L. Ed. 1489 (1945),
criticized in Note, 56 Yale L.J. 371 (1947).
10 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 605, 613, 206 N.E.2d 672, 678-679.
11 Id. at 613-614, 206 N.E.2d at 679.
12Commonwealth v. Fancy, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 771, 778-779, 207 N.E.2d 276, 282,
noted in §§11.5, 11.11 supra; Commonwealth v. Maloney, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 373,
375-376, 204 N.E.2d 891, 893.
13 G.L., c. 90C, §2.
14 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 347, 205 N.E.2d 3.
15 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 177, 204 N.E.2d 289.
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the general larceny statute.18 Commonwealth v. Chase17 is another ex-
ample of the often unnecessarily confusing relationship between the
jurisdiction of the Juvenile and the Superior Courts, and it contains a
repetition of the rule, in a situation in which the result (if not the
rationale) makes good sense, that a defendant is not in jeopardy if the
court lacks "jurisdiction" over the offense. Commonwealth v. Carson's
is an example of an instruction to the jury erroneously framed so that
it permitted the defendant to be twice convicted for the same crime.
B. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
§12.8. Felony-murder rule. Few of the decisions during the 1965
SURVEY year involved significant points on the substantive side of crimi-
nal law; for the most part the applicable substantive law was not dis-
puted. A few cases are, however, worthy of comment.
Murder in the first degree is not a unitary concept; it cannot be de-
fined simply as homicide coupled with a particular "intent," homicide
which is "deliberately premeditated with malice aforethought." In ad-
dition to this kind of homicide, the law has long punished as first-
degree murder homicide resulting from the commission of a felony,
whether "intended" or not. Plainly, in such a case, the defendant pos-
sessed the requisite intent for commission of the felony, but, when the
killing was not "intended," he lacked the "deliberately premeditated
malice aforethought" necessary for first-degree murder. Yet, rightly or
wrongly, the judges long ago concluded that these homicides embody
such dangers that they warranted the same punishment as homicide
with malice aforethought. But, unfortunately, the judges refused to
abandon the fiction that malice aforethought was an indispensable
ingredient of first-degree murder. Accordingly, they fashioned the
"felony-murder" rule, which, as Justice Spalding observed in Common-
wealth v. Balliro:1
... was formulated in England... [as] a doctrine of constructive
malice. To make out a case of murder it was necessary only to
establish that the defendant had committed a homicide while
engaged in the commission of a felony. No other evidence had to
be introduced to prove the essential element of malice afore-
thought.2
The doctrinal bridge thus developed was, of course, a pure fiction;
"constructive malice" is like a "constructive horse": it is no horse
at all. Moreover, it is a fiction of limited utility. It would be far
preferable to recognize, as does General Laws, Chapter 265, Section 1,8
16 G.L., c. 266, §30.
17 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1237, 202 N.E.2d 300.
18 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1061, 208 N.E.2d 829.
§12.8. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1145, 209 N.E.2d 308.
2Id. at 1151, 209 N.E.2d at 312.
3 But G.L., c. 265, §1, is read as being no more than a statutory embodiment of
the common law. 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1151, 209 N.E.2d at 312.
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that first-degree murder is not a unitary concept: sometimes "malice
aforethought" is required, sometimes not; and, where applicable, the
felony-murder rule simply dispenses with "intent"-it is, purely and
simply, a classic example of strict liability, imposed because society
seeks to deter the commission of felonies, serious crimes which often
pose a threat to life.
4
Such an analysis of the felony-murder focuses its attention on the
policy of the rule, not on its fictions. And in this respect Balliro is
significant since it raised one of the classic law school questions on the
scope of the rule: What result if the homicide is committed not by the
felon but by a police officer seeking to apprehend him, who, for
example, kills an innocent bystander or a cofelon? Is the felon now
guilty of first-degree murder under the rule, even though neither he
nor a cofelon committed the homicide? The Pennsylvania and Michi-
gan courts answered the question affirmatively, but as Justice Spalding
observed, they have apparently now returned to the orthodox view5
that the felony-murder rule dispenses only with proving "intent," and
not also with proving that the defendant (or his cofelon) committed
the act, i.e., the homicide. 6 But the reasons for not applying the
felony-murder rule go much deeper than this fiction, as the citations
in Justice Spalding's opinion show.7 Essentially, the limitation repre-
sents an attempt to impose some reasonable limit on a rule of question-
able efficacy, and one which, through its imposition of strict liability,
challenges some of our most deeply held ideas of criminal respon-
sibility.8
Commonwealth v. Dellelo9 illustrates another important facet of
the felony-murder rule. If one felon commits a homicide while in the
commission of a felony, so that he would be subject to the felony-
murder rule, cofelons participating in the felonious "joint enterprise"
are also guilty of felony-murder. Both the "act" (homicide) and the
"constructive intent" (supplied by the felony-murder rule) are im-
puted" to them, if another label may yet be used; in short, the partners
in crime are held strictly liable for each other's activities.' 0
In Dellelo, the defendant did not question these rules; rather his
4 In fact, however, the alleged deterrent effect of the rule has been widely chal-
lenged. See materials cited in notes 7 and 8 infra.
5 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1145, 1153, 209 N.E.2d 308, 314.
6ld. at 1153, 209 N.E.2d at 314.
7 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 274-281 (2d ed. 1960). Morris, The
Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 50 (1956).
8 It is interesting to note that in other areas of the criminal law attempts to substi-
tute the mens rea of a lesser offense for that of a greater one have been vigorously
rejected. See, for example, Regina v. Faulknor, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 550 (1817). More-
over, England has abolished the felony-murder rule. See Section I of the English
Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. II, c. 11, and it has been severely limited in the
Model Penal Code. See Tent. Draft No. 9, §201.2(l)(b) (1959).
9 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1171, 209 N.E.2d 303. See also Macauley, A Penal Code
Prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, Note M. 64-65 (1837).
10 But see notes 8-11, §12.7, supra, and accompanying text for an important limita-
tion on "partnership liability."
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challenge went to their applicability. He and a confederate attempted
armed robbery of a jewelry store; the robbery was foiled, and during
the attempted escape the cofelon slew a police officer. Dellelo objected
to the application of the felony-murder rule to him on the ground
that at the time of the homicide the partnership had been severed -
"the defendant had already withdrawn from the criminal enterprise.""
The Court, however, refused to treat the escape as a nonintegral part
of the crime of robbery. It stressed that what the defendant thought as to
when the common enterprise was ended was not determinative; rather,
the situation "must be looked at objectively";' 2 and "if one of the ele-
ments incident to the crime such as an escape or flight [results in
homicide], the killing is referable to the robbery; and whether the act
of escape or flight is a continuous part of the attempted or accomplished
crime is for the jury to determine.' u3 In the case at bar, "[t]hese acts,
all in rapid sequence, could be found to be parts of a single brief
transaction."1
4
§12.9. Miscellaneous substantive law decisions. In Common-
wealth v. Peterson' a potential substantive attack on the constitution-
ality of General Laws, Chapter 123A, the Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act, was glossed over. The defendant was serving a sentence for assault
with a dangerous weapon when the prison superintendent, suspecting
that the defendant might be a sexually dangerous person, initiated
proceedings which ultimately resulted in the defendant's confinement.
The defendant contended that "since he was not serving sentences
for offences of a sexual nature, . . . and there was no evidence of any
sexual misbehavior while in prison,"2 the statute could not be con-
stitutionally applied to him. This argument was rejected in an opinion
which stressed that the commitment procedures are so framed that
commitment "cannot be the result of hasty or arbitrary action, and...
the rights of a prisoner are carefully protected." 3 But the problem
presented is more complex than simply one of procedural due process.
An issue of grave moment was suggested by the defendant's argument:
To what extent may a person be deprived of his liberty, when he has
not committed any overt antisocial behavior; that is, to what extent
may he be committed, not because of his acts but because of his
alleged "propensities," as discovered by practitioners of a still very
inexact science. It will be noted that the Massachusetts statute requires
some overt antisocial act - either of a sexual or some other criminal
character -before it may be invoked.4 Some commitment statutes,
however, do not even require the commission of any overt antisocial
11 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1171, 1174, 209 N.E.2d 303, 306.
12 Ibid.
13 Id. at 1175, 209 N.E.2d at 306.
14 Ibid.
§12.9. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 483, 205 N.E.2d 719.
2 Id. at 484, 205 N.E.2d at 720-721.
3 Id. at 485, 205 N.E.2d at 721.
4 G.L., c. 123A, §§4, 6.
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act.5 There are, of course, large questions of policy and indeed of
constitutionality, questions not answered by the empty "civil". and
"criminal" dichotomy, which are presented when a person is com-
mitted for his tendencies rather than his acts.
Commissioner of the Metropolitan District Commission v. Director
of Civil Service6 contains an excellent discussion of the effects of a
pardon. justice Cutter observed that much confusion has resulted
from the broad language in Ex parte Garland7 that a pardon "releases
the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eyes
of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense." 8 Rather, said Justice Cutter, it makes little sense to refuse
to recognize that most of those pardoned were in fact guilty. Accord-
ingly, where good character is a necessary qualification the facts sur-
rounding the conviction could be taken into consideration for public
employment.9
In Commonwealth v. Stasiun'O the Court, over the dissent of Justice
Kirk, held that solicitation of bribes could be charged as a continuing
offense, rather than as a series of separate requests for a bribe. In
John Bath & Co. v. Commonwealth" an employer was adjudged in
criminal contempt for obstructing justice because he fired an employee,
during his service on jury duty, for failure to report for work.
5 Paulsen & Kadish, The Criminal Law and Its Process 111-124 (1962), contains a
useful collection of materials on the subject. The federal courts are beginning to
show heightened interest in these loosely drawn commitment statutes. See SAS v.
Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
6 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1345, 203 N.E.2d 95. Accord: Murray v. Louisiana, 347 F.2d
825 (5th Cir. 1965).
7 4 Wall. 333, 380 (U.S. 1866).
8 4 Wall. at 380.
9 "We adopt, so far as applicable to the facts before us, Professor Williston's view
of the 'true line of distinction' . . . as follows: 'The pardon removes all legal pun-
ishment for the offence. Therefore if the mere conviction involves certain disquali-
fications which would not follow from the commission of the crime without con-
viction, the pardon removes such disqualifications. On the other hand, if character
is a necessary qualification and the commission of a crime would disqualify even
though there had been no criminal prosecution for the crime, the fact that the
criminal has been convicted and pardoned does not make him any more eligible.'
In other words, even if a pardon may remit all penal consequences of a criminal
conviction, it cannot obliterate the acts which constituted the crime. These acts are
historical facts . . . which, despite the public act of mercy and forgiveness implicit
in the pardon, ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequent
dealings with the actor." 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1345, 1354, 203 N.E.2d 95, 102. The
Court expressly refused to bog itself down in distinctions between "full" and "con-
ditional" pardons, but left open the question of pardon granted to eradicate a
wrongful conviction.
10 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 605, 206 N.E.2d 672.
11 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1213, 202 N.E.2d 249, also noted in §15.11 infra.
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